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As technological innovation invades every facet of life and par-
ticularly as unobtrusive monitoring devices become more easily
available, the tension between safety and privacy will become an
important issue.1 This tension is already problematic in the nurs-
ing home industry because of tiny, hidden cameras referred to as
"granny-cams."2 The availability and affordability of this technol-
ogy' will likely lead to its pervasive use in the long-term care
arena, as families become aware of the potential protective func-
tion these devices can serve.4 However, because this technology is
new, and for the most part unaddressed by law, this paper
explores the rights of patients, their families, employees, and
nursing homes in private, long-term care facilities.5 In doing so,
* Elizabeth Adelman, J.D., M.L.S. is a Reference Librarian at the College of
Law Library, Georgia State University. The author wishes to thank Rose Mary
Bailly for her inspiration and guidance, and Lydia Meunier, Nancy Johnson and
Kristina Niedringhaus for their editorial assistance. I dedicate this article to Lily
Adelman whose "intrusion" into my life made this article possible.
I See Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl because you're on Candid Camera:
Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1997) (discussing
video surveillance in various situations; such as, public streets, automobiles,
homes, and other public areas).
2 See Douglas J. Edwards, All Eyes are on Granny Cams, NURSING HoMEs,
Nov. 1, 2000, 26-30 (discussing the benefits and problems associated with the use
of video surveillance equipment in nursing homes).
3 See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION 121, 125-28 (2000) (describing hidden
camera companies, which package low-cost products in unsuspecting forms such
as alarm clocks, smoke detectors, and other household fixtures).
I Edwards, supra note 2, at 28 (citing safety and security for loved ones in
nursing homes as a reason why families choose to install video surveillance
equipment in residents' rooms). The reasoning discussed by the author is to
ensure the safety and security of the residents. Id.
I See Jones v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 874 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(dismissing federal civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of the wiretap statute because the private employer was not a state
actor). State and federal government employees, and possibly residents of public
nursing homes, are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections that employees
and residents in a private setting are not entitled. Id. Searches and seizures by
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this paper focuses on the law in California, Florida, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Texas - the five states with the largest popula-
tion of residents sixty-five years of age and older.6
Part II of this paper explores existing federal and applicable
state wiretapping statutes.7 Part III attempts to define "zones of
privacy" within the nursing home, while exploring the privacy
rights of nursing home residents and employees, as well as the
responsibilities of nursing home administrators." Finally, Part IV




Wiretap statutes exist on both the federal and state levels. In
general, the statutes aim to protect the privacy of unsuspecting
parties whose conversation and/or likeness are captured by a
recording device. However, invasions of privacy with new technol-
ogy often fall outside the protection of wiretapping statutes. 1°
A. Federal
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, also
known as the Federal Wiretap Act, governs the use of surveillance
devices that record voices.11 The Act does not attempt to prohibit
or regulate the use of silent video recording. 2 Under this Act,
consent to surveillance by one party to the communication is the
minimum requirement to evade prosecution for voice recording:
"It shall not be unlawful.., to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communica-
state actors (government employers) may trigger a Fourth Amendment violation.
See id. Private employers, however, are not considered state actors. Id.
6 Population 65 Years and Over and 85 Years and Over, Region, and State:
1998, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (showing the sixty-five and over population of listed
states), at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/state/st98elderly.txt (last
visited on Apr. 19, 2002).
7 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 10-29 and
accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 30-106 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 107-31 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing various Federal
wiretapping statutes); see also infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
11 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12), (16),
2511(1)(e), 2512(3), 2516(1)(a), (c), (j)-(p), 2518(11)(b)(ii), (12) (Supp. V 2000).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that the Wiretap Act "does not include silent video surveillance").
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tion or where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception ....
The Act also makes the manufacture, distribution, or possession
of a device that is designed for the secret interception of electronic
communications unlawful.14
B. State
At the present time, Texas is the only state that has enacted a
law addressing the use of granny-cams. 15 The Texas statute
allows electronic surveillance in nursing homes with consent of
the resident or their guardian and any roommates affected. 16 The
statute provides a defense to nursing home residents, or their
guardians, who would otherwise be in violation of the state's wire-
tapping statute by installing such devices.
17
Similar to the Federal Wiretap Act, New York State Law does
not prohibit silent video surveillance.' The statutory definition of
electronic communication includes images and sounds, however
13 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (noting that this chapter applies to persons who are
not acting under the "color of law").
14 See id. § 2512, amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2512(3) (Supp. V 2000).
15 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 242.841-.852 (Vernon 2002)
(discussing the logistics surrounding legal installation of video surveillance in
nursing homes); see also supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (describing
the Texas Law allowing video surveillance in nursing homes).
16 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 242.846(b)-(c) (describing a consent
form's requirements authorizing video surveillance in a multi-person nursing
home). The main requirement in Texas is to obtain consent of the parties
involved and providing notice to those who may be subjected to the surveillance.
See id. § 242.846(b)(3), (c).
17 See id. § 242.842(a).
18 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2000) ("A person is guilty of
eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping, mechanical
overhearing of a conversation, or intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication."); Id. § 250.10 ("A person is guilty of possession of eavesdropping
devices when, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or to permit the
same to be used in violation of section 250.05, he possesses any instrument,
device or equipment designed for, adapted to or commonly used in wiretapping or
mechanical overhearing of a conversation."); Id § 250.00 (defining the
mechanical overhearing of a conversation as "the intentional overhearing or
recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one
party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument,
device or equipment").
20021 823
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only interception is illegal. 19 The statute stops short of making it
a crime for those who create the images.2 °
Unlike New York, California's Invasion of Privacy statutes pro-
vide more privacy protections. 21 The legislative intent of these
statutes acknowledges the rapid change in technology that creates
a "threat to the free exercise of personal liberties."22 The Califor-
nia wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes reflect this policy.
The wiretapping statute prohibits "intercepting communications
by an unauthorized connection to the transmission line,"23 and the
eavesdropping statute prohibits "the interception of communica-
tions by the use of equipment which is not connected to any trans-
mission line."24 In addition, the manufacture, sale, or possession
of devices used to eavesdrop are prohibited by statute in
California.25
Consent of all parties to the communication, however, is a
requirement in California, 26  Florida,27 and Pennsylvania 21 in
order to avoid a violation of their eavesdropping statutes. In addi-
tion, California law stipulates that the conversation in question
must be a confidential communication, meaning that the conver-
19 See id § 250.00. The statutory definition of electronic communication is:
[Any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical system, but does not
include: ... any communication made through a tracking device consisting of
an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the
movement of a person or object....
Id. § 250.00; see also §250.05.
20 See Joel Cohen & Claude Szyfer, Private Taping of Conversations: What the
Law Says, N.Y.L.J., May 31, 2000, at 8 (stating that taping telephone
conversations, in which the taper is part of the conversation, is legal in New
York). However, the article also says that if the taper is not a party to the
conversation, as would possibly be a video taper in a granny-cam situation, that
taper under New York law, has engaged in illegal eavesdropping. Id.
21 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-37.9 (West 1999) with N.Y. PENAL CODE
§§ 250.00-.35 (McKinney 2000) (comparing the broadness of California's privacy
statute to the narrower New York statute).
22 CAL. PENAL CODE § 630.
23 People v. Ratekin, 261 Cal. Rptr. 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing
wiretapping from eavesdropping); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 631.
24 Ratehin, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 145; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 635.
26 Cf. id. § 632(a).
27 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(3)(d) (West 2001).
28 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (West 2001).
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sation must take place under circumstances which the parties to
the conversation do not want others to hear.29
III. PRIVACY
Although there is a reasonable expectation of privacy within a
home, "New York courts have consistently held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a resi-
dential building, such as the lobby, common hallways and stair-
wells."3 ° In addition, a New York court held that there is both no
expectation of privacy in a hospital and no Fourth Amendment
violation when the allegedly private activity has already been
seen publicly and is later viewed in a similar fashion. 1 In this
case, after the police arrested and subsequently acquired defen-
dant's blood-stained clothing from hospital staff, the defendant
"abandoned any privacy interest he had in [his clothing's] outward
appearance by displaying them to the public at large when he
wore them to the hospital."32 On the other hand, the court in
Cherry v. Koch 33 stated that "some conduct is protected under the
zone of privacy even when it occurs in semipublic places."34 The
court listed a hospital as one such semi-private place.3"
California courts have also held that the public hallway of a hos-
pital is a public place.36 However, one California court pointed out
that there are private areas within hospitals as well. Hospital
rooms, for example, have "joint dominion."37 In other words, even
if a patient implicitly waives his or her rights to privacy when in
the company of hospital employees, his or her hospital room is
29 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c); compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5702
(defining oral communication as "any oral communication uttered by a person
possessing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation.").
30 People v. Farrow, 642 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (Crim. Ct. 1996).
31 See People v. Hayes, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
32 See id.
33 129 Misc. 2d 346 (N. Y. Sup Ct. 1985), affd as modified, 514 N.Y.S.2d 30
(App. Div. 1987).
34 Id. at 354.
35 Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
36 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 151 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (Ct App. 1979) ("Many
areas of a hospital are public places and as such are not areas subject to
constitutional protection from entry without [a] warrant . . . . The public
hallway... [is] clearly such an area."). This is so because the hallway is open to
all members of the public, including state actors. See id.
37 See id. at 754.
2002] 825
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considered a private area to all others.38 In addition, protection of
privacy in the home of a California resident is afforded where
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. 9
Florida statutes, on the other hand, explicitly protect the pri-
vacy of nursing home residents by providing:
The right to have privacy in treatment and in caring for personal
needs; to close room doors and to have facility personnel knock
before entering the room, except in the case of an emergency or
unless medically contraindicated .... Privacy of the resident's body
shall be maintained during, but not limited to, toileting, bathing,
and other activities of personal hygiene, except as needed for resi-
dent safety or assistance.
40
Florida statutes also afford "[t]he right to be treated courte-
ously, fairly, and with the fullest measure of dignity,"41 as well as
"[tihe right to be free from mental and physical abuse."
4 2
Additionally, Florida courts have acknowledged privacy rights
afforded to dwellers of semi-permanent residences, such as nurs-
ing homes and motels, compared to the privacy of those in public
places, such as emergency rooms.43 Pennsylvania courts mirror
this sentiment.44
The holding in Huskey v. National Broadcasting Company
45 is"
also illustrative of privacy rights in an institutional setting.
Although Huskey involves the privacy rights of an inmate in a
public institution, the case helps define areas of institutions in
38 See id. (noting that a hospital room is not traditionally known as a public
area).
39 See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (noting that an intrusion tort
is recognized in California).
40 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.022(1)(m) (West 1998).
41 Id. § 400.022(1)(n).
42 Id. § 400.022(1)(o).
43 See Beverly Enterprises-Florida Inc. v. Deutsch, 765 So. 2d 778, 782, 784
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the broad privacy rights granted by
Florida statutes extend over the "pronounced concern for the privacy of nursing
home patients."); see also Buchanan v. State, 432 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (disregarding defendant's assertion of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a "busy hospital emergency room where medical personnel were
constantly walking in and out and where he could have expected to remain only a
few hours at most").
44 See United States v. Franklin, 64 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(denying the notion that an expectation of privacy exists in a hospital emergency
room); see also Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993)
(recognizing a legitimate expectation of privacy in a motel room during the rental
period).
41 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
826 [Vol. 12
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which a resident has a legitimate expectation of privacy.46 As an
inmate in the Marion Illinois Penitentiary, NBC video crews
filmed Arnold B. Huskey without his permission while exercising
in a gym, dressed only in gym shorts.47 The inmate filed suit
alleging, among other claims, a common law invasion of privacy
for an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.48
The plaintiff claimed he was engaged in private activities, in a
place designated for those activities, and expected only to be seen
by other security guards or inmates. 49 The court noted, "Huskey's
visibility to some people does not strip him of the right to remain
secluded from others."5 ° The opinion went on to state that
although prisons are closed systems where prisoners are super-
vised by prison guards and in plain view of other prisoners, there
remains an expectation of privacy in areas not normally open to
outsiders .51
Defining the zone of privacy in nursing homes also requires an
exploration of the nature of the facility. A nursing home is "a
quasi-private facility."52 The "public license," or the ability for
people to come and go on the premises of a private nursing home,
is limited by the very nature of the facility and the responsibilities
of the administration.53 For example, the resident of a nursing
home can restrict unwanted visitors while people without busi-
ness on the premises are restricted by the administration for
health and safety reasons.54
Like the prison setting, the nursing home setting has an estab-
lished zone of privacy, but with expected intrusions inherent in
the proper functioning of the institution. In fact, there are areas
of the facility that are designated "open," and others that are
restricted to outsiders. Also, residents often share rooms with
other residents and doors are left open for staff monitoring and for
residents to welcome visitors. In addition, health care workers
enter rooms to assist with aspects of everyday living that are pri-
46 See generally id. at 1287-89.
47 Id. at 1285.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 1285, 1286.
50 Id. at 1288.
51 Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1287-88.
52 People v. Marino, 515 N.Y.S.2d 162, 166 (J. Ct. 1986).
13 See id. (stating that a medical facility is not maintained for public use and
"[tihe public license to use is not as broad as in the case of an airport terminal, a
state university campus or a welfare office").
54 See id.
20021 827
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vate by their very nature. Although it could be argued that the
presence or appearance of health care workers in a resident's
room at any time removes any expectation of privacy, Huskey
shows that healthcare workers, like prison guards, are a continu-
ous and expected presence, and residents may become "under-
standably inured to the gaze of staff' and other residents.55
Accordingly, privacy in a nursing home is multi-layered. Nurs-
ing home employees and residents, as compared to visitors, may
be afforded a larger zone of acceptable invasion of privacy.
Residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain
areas of the institution. Although there is some ambiguity in the
distinction between public and private areas of such an institu-
tion, we can safely assign community rooms and hallways as pub-
lic areas and bathrooms as private areas. All other areas
arguably fall on a continuum somewhere in between.
Although, for some purposes, nursing homes and hospitals are
treated the same, 6 nursing home life appears to fall somewhere
between a residential building where there is a greater expecta-
tion of privacy, and a hospital where there is a diminished expec-
tation of privacy. Thus the question of whether employees and
residents of a private nursing home have an expectation of privacy
from video surveillance is raised.
A. Privacy Rights of Residents
Although the law protecting nursing home residents' right to
privacy is well settled in Florida,57 the law is less clear in the
other four states. 58 These states generally extend the protection
of privacy in the home.59 Pennsylvania's Wiretap Act explicitly
acknowledges privacy in the home, as long as the home is not usu-
ally open to the public.6" Texas recognizes an expectation of pri-
vacy within the home as long as the private act was "out of view of
passers-by."6
1
55 Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288.
56 See, e.g., Margaret M. Flint, Nursing Homes, in BASIc ELDER LAW 2000
§ 10:2, at 452 (Practicing Law Institute, 2000) (explaining that a nursing home
and hospital are treated as one in the same for purposes of the New York State
Department of Health regulations).
57 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (West 2001).
61 Mayberry v. State, 532 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
[Vol. 12828
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Conversely, there are no New York statutes that "protect indi-
viduals from being observed in what should be considered their
private residence. 62 New York nursing home residents' "zone of
privacy" within the facility they call home must be established in
order to define the boundaries of privacy. New York State Regula-
tions provide each patient with the minimum amount of "privacy
consistent with the provision of appropriate care.
63
As a general rule, consent of a nursing home resident is neces-
sary prior to covert surveillance. 64 Thus, even a family member
does not necessarily have inherent authority over the resident.65
For example, New York and Florida cases hold that one spouse
cannot record telephone conversations between the other spouse
and a third party,66 suggesting that even the intimate marital
relationship provides protection from monitoring. Any family
member or guardian, including the spouse, cannot consent to the
monitoring of a competent resident. Applying the "zone of pri-
vacy" rationale of Huskey to a private nursing home, consent is
necessary to videotape nursing home residents in the privacy of
their room because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area they call "home." Additionally, roommates of the resident
in question have privacy rights as well. 67 Although a roommate
implicitly consents to invasions of some aspects of his or her pri-
vacy by sharing a room, residents do not implicitly give consent to
be monitored.
68
62 SENATE MAJORITY TASK FORCE ON THE INVASION OF PRIVACY, N.Y.S.S. 2000
LEG. SESSION, March 2000 Report, at 19.
63 N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10 § 405.7(b)(12) (2001).
64 Interception of Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
65 Cf. id. (stating that the interception of communication must be between
parties or with the consent of one of the parties).
66 See Pica v. Pica, 417 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529-30 (App. Div. 1979) (stating that
defendant husband could not record the telephone conversation between his wife
and a third party); see also Connin v. Connin, 392 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (Sup.Ct.
1976) (involving evidence sought in matrimonial actions); Markham v.
Markham, 265 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) ("A husband has no more
right to tap a telephone located in the marital home than has a wife to tap a
telephone situated in the husband's office.").
67 See Patrick Kampert, Video Watchdog; Some Nursing Homes Welcome
Cameras, but Many Fear Unleashing a Monster, CHI. TRm., Mar. 24, 2002, at 1
(stating that when one family member installs a camera in a room, privacy issues
immediately pop up with regard to the roommate), available at 2002 WL
2637369.
68 See Vince Galloro, Watching out for Nursing Home Residents: Cameras
could Help Curb Abuse but Others Argue they Invade Patient Privacy, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 14, 2001, at 24, 26.
20021 829
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State statutes aside, the Federal Wiretap Act criminalizes the
use of any device that is used primarily for secret surveillance.69
Devices used primarily for covert surveillance of parties in com-
munication violates the Federal Wiretap Act, regardless of con-
sent.7 ° In contrast, the surveillance of common areas in nursing
homes is a common practice for security reasons,7 ' and would fall
outside this federal statute as long as their equipment is not
designed for covert surveillance and notice of monitoring is posted.
B. Privacy Rights of Employees
Although surveillance in the workplace is believed to foster low
employee morale, v2 companies commonly monitor for quality
assurance, protection of property, or investigation of employees'
behaviors. 73 American workers in private employment settings
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
70 See Jay Goldberg, A Little Known Hidden Problem within the Federal
Wiretap Statute, 14 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP., Oct. 2000, at 1, 5, 7.
71 See Lindsay Peterson, Patients' Advocates, State's Nursing Homes at Odds
Over Video Cameras, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 30, 2001, at 1 ("The cameras are only in
the common areas - kitchen, porch, living room - and were installed originally to
give out-of-town relatives a way to observe their loved ones .... "), available at
2001 WL 26696068; see also David Crary, Video Systems Worry Nursing Homes,
MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Apr. 1, 2001, at 20A (quoting a Lake City, Florida owner of
an assisted living facility who has installed cameras in the common areas of the
facility: "'I want to keep an eye on my people and see what's going on.... I'll put
cameras anywhere it won't invade the privacy of residents.'"), available at 2001
WL 9347662; Jane Adler, Home Safe Home Seniors-Only Villages have a Lock on
Security, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2000, at 5 (noting that surveillance cameras are
used in the common areas of assisted-living facilities for security purposes),
available at 2000 WL 3723894; Galloro, supra note 68, at 25 (noting that
cameras are used by the owner of several Irvine, California long-term-care
facilities in the common areas of her facilities, as well as in the rooms of patients
with moderate or severe dementia, based on the consent of the resident's
guardians); see also Greg Gittrich, Granny Cams Help Kin Watch Over Elderly,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 9, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 23585557. Some
nursing homes have taken this one step further by allowing "virtual visitation"
with residents over the Internet. See id. The Hebrew Home for the Aged in
Riverdale, New York, recently installed six cameras in the recreational areas of
the home. Id. Out of seventy-five residents, only four refused to give consent to
the surveillance. Id. When one of the four enters a room under surveillance, the
camera is turned off. Id. Also, family members are given a password to log on
via the Internet. Id. However, this program is experimental and is being
monitored by the New York State Department of Health. See id.
72 See Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in
the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 379, 381 (2000).
73 See Richard A. West, Jr., Workplace Privacy: A Reasonable Expectation or
an Illusory Idea?, N.J. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 14 (noting that the "[mionitoring and
surveillance of employees has become commonplace in the modern business
workplace").
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are generally not protected from surveillance because the prem-
ises, equipment, and supplies are the property of the employer. 4
Furthermore, Fourth Amendment protections against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures do not apply to employees in private
employment settings.75 Finally, an at-will employment situation
gives rise to implicit consent to monitoring because an at-will
employee can be discharged without cause. 76 Therefore, at-will
employees have less power over the conditions of their employ-
ment because complaints can lead to discharge. While this unsta-
ble employment situation subjects the employee to working
conditions that they may dislike, implicit consent to the working
conditions is maintained by continued employment.7 7
Generally, employees in private settings have little right to pri-
vacy, and these rights are further diminished by statute.
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA)78 was enacted to update the Wiretap Act to account for
new forms of electronic communication, it prohibits the intercep-
tion of data by any electronic means, even though it does provide
for exceptions with regard to employees.7 9 One such relevant
exception is monitoring for supervision or evaluation of employ-
ees.80 Another exception allows for monitoring when the employer
has made the employees aware of the monitoring or where there is
an established monitoring policy.8" Under this exception, contin-
ued employment implies that the employee consented to monitor-
ing.82 Further, "liif a party to the communication other than the
employee under surveillance agrees to the monitoring, there need
71 See Rothstein, supra note 72, at 382-83. Employees in private settings,
however, have some legal rights against surveillance. They can bring a tort
action for intrusion into seclusion, in states where this tort is recognized, where
an intrusion occurs, either physically or through electronic surveillance, in an
area that a reasonable person would find offensive or highly objectionable. See
id. at 382. Areas that are considered offensive or highly objectionable include,
but are not limited to, employee locker rooms and bathrooms. Id. at 382-83.
Thus, surveillance of a room of a nursing home resident would not fall under the
offensive or highly objectionable category for an employee.
75 Id. at 400.
76 See id. at 402.
77 Id. at 402.
78 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
'9 See Rothstein, supra note 72, at 401-02 (noting that Congress enacted the
ECPA to update the Wiretap Act to account for new forms of electronic
communication).
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be no knowledge or consent of the employee." 3 Additionally,
silent video surveillance falls outside the ECPA because the ECPA
only protects wire, oral, and electronic communications. 4 Elec-
tronic communication is defined as any "transfer of signs, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system."8 5
Besides protecting oral communications that the employee rea-
sonably expects to be private, the ECPA also protects oral commu-
nications that employees expect not to be intercepted. 6 This
subtle distinction can best be explained by distinguishing between
situations where employees are in a public setting but have an
expectation of non-interception (e.g., sales clerk at cash register)
as compared to situations where employees have an expectation of
privacy (e.g., co-workers chatting in break room).
State privacy laws also provide some protections for private sec-
tor employees. Some states recognize the common law invasion of
privacy of unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another as
applied to workplace settings. When balancing the interests of
the parties involved within the workplace environment, courts
tend to evaluate: whether the intrusion would have been offensive
to a reasonable person; whether the employee had a subjective
expectation of privacy; whether that expectation of privacy was
reasonable; and if there were legitimate business justifications for
the alleged intrusion. 8
83 Id. at 402-03; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
84 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
85 Id. § 2510(12).
86 Cf id. § 2510(2).
87 See Rothstein, supra note 72, at 405.
8 See id. (listing two independent considerations for privacy outside of the
employment setting). "(1) Did the individual intruded upon have a legitimate
expectation of privacy ?; (2) Did the legally protected interests of the intruder
outweigh the legitimate expectation of privacy?" Id.
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Although New York does not recognize this tort,8 9 California,9 °
Florida,91 Pennsylvania, 92 and Texas 93 do recognize it. Califor-
nia's tort, for example, has two elements: "'(1) the intrusion into a
private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly
offensive to a reasonable person."' 94 Under the intrusion theory, a
plaintiff is likely to succeed if she can "show that the defendant
penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding,
or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff."9 5 The
plaintiff must have also had an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in the place where the intrusion occurred.
96
Video and audio monitoring of employees is common, however,
silent video surveillance of public areas of the workplace, where
employees have little expectation of privacy, will not usually be
considered a tortious invasion of privacy.9 7  Conversely, rest
rooms, locker rooms, and private offices are areas clothed with a
reasonable expectation of privacy and are areas where silent video
surveillance should never occur. Potential liability can be avoided
by simply giving notice of the surveillance to the employee. Also
pertinent to privacy rights of employees are the federal and state
wiretapping statutes previously discussed.98
89 See Tonianne Florentino, Workplace Privacy in the Technology Revolution,
in FIRST ANN. INST. ON PRIVACY L.: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH
TECH & CHANGING REG. ENVT 281, 283 (Practicing Law Institute 2000)
(explaining that private employees in New York have no reasonable expectation
of privacy within the workplace).
90 See, e.g., Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing
the intrusion upon seclusion tort as adopted by the Restatement Second of
Torts).
91 See, e.g., Goosen v. Walker, 714 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding a neighbor's repeated videotaping of other neighbors while in their own
backyard an activity that is not constitutionally protected).
92 See, e.g., Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 135-36 (Pa. 1974) (noting
that "[t]he Restatement (Second) of Torts has . . . arrived at an accurate
formulation of the tort of invasion of privacy." Id.
93 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (analogizing the invasion of privacy tort to an intentional tort
such as trespass or battery).
94 Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharms., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410, 415 (Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 416 (explaining that an intrusion need not constitute "absolute or
complete privacy") (citation omitted).
98 See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
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C. Responsibilities of Nursing Home Administrators
Federal and state regulations carry a strong inference that the
administrator of a nursing home facility is ultimately responsible
for the quality of care of each resident. 99 The Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1987 (OBRA) sets forth standards for patients' rights.
In addition, states have laws and regulations that must be com-
plied with. Standing alone, however, OBRA establishes adminis-
trator liability.
OBRA states that the administrator is responsible for the over-
all management of the nursing home.100 The NYCRR states that
"[tihe facility shall: (i) not use, or permit, verbal, mental, sexual or
physical abuse, including corporal punishment, or involuntary
seclusion of residents .... ,,' In addition, allegations of abuse or
mistreatment must be reported to the administrator. 102 The facil-
ity bears the burden of establishing that reported violations are
investigated, that precautions are taken to safeguard allegedly
abused patients during the investigation process, and that action
is taken if abuse is proven. 10 3 "The resident has the right to be
free from verbal, sexual, physical, and mental abuse, corporal
punishment, and involuntary seclusion. . . . The facility must
develop and implement written policies and procedures that pro-
hibit mistreatment, neglect, and abuse of residents....",,o Fur-
ther, New York regulations ensure that "[r]esident rooms shall be
designed and equipped for adequate nursing care, comfort and pri-
vacy of residents."
105
OBRA holds the nursing home administrator ultimately respon-
sible for the care and protection of each resident.' 6 From the
administrator's standpoint, nursing homes should establish poli-
cies about video surveillance by third parties and other residents
99 See NURSING HoME LITIGATION: INVESTIGATION AND CASE PREPARATION 142
(Patricia W. Iyer ed., 1999).
100 Requirements for States and Long Term Care Facilities, 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.75(d)(2)(ii) (2001); cf N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.4(b)
(1997) ("The nursing home shall develop and implement written policies and
procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect or abuse of residents of
misappropriation of resident property.").
101 tit. 10, § 415.4 (b)(1)(i).
102 42 C.F.R. § 483.13 (c)(2), (4) (2001); tit. 10, § 415.4(b)(2).
103 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(c)(3).
104 Id. § 483.13(b), (c); cf. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.4(b).
105 tit. 10, § 415.29(c).
106 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1, 483.25 ("Each resident must receive and the facility
must provide the necessary care and services to attain or maintain the highest
practicable... well-being").
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as a good faith effort to address the safety, responsibility and sen-
sibilities of all parties involved. A showing of this good faith effort
may reduce the amount of liability assigned in future litigation for
any cause of action related to monitoring. An established policy
addressing this issue also makes the administration more
approachable. The party that requests the monitoring will know
exactly what steps must be taken and the party's role in the pro-
cess. It will also serve as a reminder that cases of alleged abuse or
mistreatment will be reported and taken seriously.
An established policy on video monitoring will also protect
employees. Guidelines should be issued that will outline what
employees should expect when monitoring occurs. These guide-
lines, at a minimum, should have a notice requirement. For
example, the policy should establish that a room under video sur-
veillance will be marked clearly with a visible sign. In addition, a
policy reduces the chance of employer liability. An employee who
maintains employment in a private nursing facility that has an
established monitoring policy gives implied consent to monitoring
in areas outside of the employee locker room and bathroom.
IV. THE MARYLAND MODEL
Maryland State Representative Sue Hecht walked into her
mother's room in a Maryland nursing home and saw her mother
being abused.107 She cites this as the reason for introducing
Maryland House Bill No. 433 on February 1, 2001.108 The bill
requires a nursing home facility to allow a resident or her legal
representative to monitor the resident in the resident's room
through the use of any electronic monitoring device.'0 9 However,
the resident or legal representative must request and pay for the
service. 110 Further, written consent of any roommate(s) is also
required."1 Notice of the surveillance must be posted on the door
of the room. 1 2 Representative Hecht believes that this is a
107 See Sue Hecht Discusses Legislation She's Introduced to Video Cameras in
Nursing Homes, NPR: MORNING EDITION, (National Public Radio Feb. 22, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 9326604 [hereinafter Hecht].
108 See id.; see also H.B. 433, 415th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2001),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2001rs/billfile/hb0433.htm (last visited Apr.
22, 2002).
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residents' rights issue and that the privacy rights of employees are
not invaded for those that are performing their job properly.
113
Aside from addressing how the law will circumvent any wiretap
laws that apply, the Maryland Model addresses many problems
from the nursing home, employee, and resident perspectives.
114
First, it protects the nursing home from liability for not protecting
the privacy and well-being of the resident." 5 An open policy
shifts the liability for any subsequent secret cameras to the defen-
dant trespasser. 1 16 Second, it requires consent of any room-
mate(s) that would be affected by the surveillance." 7 Third, it
provides notice to anyone entering the premises while still pro-
tecting the patient. 118 Fourth, the resident or the resident's fam-
ily must pay the costs involved in the installation, maintenance,
and electricity used for the surveillance. 119 Finally, this bill pro-
vides some protection for residents who fear retaliation by abusive
employees.' 2 °
However, the Maryland Bill died when the 2001 Legislative Ses-
sion ended, 12 1 but other states have attempted to address video
surveillance in nursing homes through similar legislation.
1 22
However, to date, Texas is the only state that has passed a statute
relating to electronic monitoring devices in nursing homes. 123 The
Texas statute addresses all of the issues raised by Hecht's bill.
1 24
The Texas statute allows electronic monitoring with written
consent by either a resident with capacity, or a resident who lacks
capacity but provides consent through a guardian or legal repre-
113 See Hecht, supra note 108.
114 See generally Md. H.B. 433; cf. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10,
§ 415.29(c).
115 See generally Md. H.B. 433
116 See id.
117 See id. (showing the requirements for each resident, which are consistent
even if sharing one room); see generally Hecht, supra note 108 ("If there's
another resident living in the room, we have to get written consent.").
118 Md. H.B. 433.
119 Id.
120 See id.; see also Hecht, supra note 108 (explaining that individuals who
tamper with a nursing home resident's installed video camera could face
punishment).
121 See Md. H.B. 433.
122 See, e.g., S.B. 242, 103rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (died in committee); H.B.
1202, 182nd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001), WL 2001 MA. H.B. 1202 (SN);
H.B. 996, 2001 Leg., Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2001), WL 2001 NC H.B. 996 (SN); H.B.
3344, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001), WL 2001 TX H.B. 3344 (SN).
123 See Thx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 242.841-.852 (Vernon 2001).
124 See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
836 [Vol. 12
SURVEILLANCE IN NURSING HOMES
sentative. 125 Additionally, the Texas statute's consent form provi-
sion may release the institution from civil liability arising from
any privacy violation directly related to the use of surveillance.
126
Furthermore, it allows the resident or guardian to choose what
areas of the room will be monitored in order to protect the dignity
of the resident. 27 However, in doing so the guardian must "obtain
the consent of other residents in the room."1 28 The statute also
requires notice to visitors and employees at both the entrance to
the institution,1 29 as well as the entrance to the resident's
room. 130 Finally, the Texas statue also protects the resident from
various forms of retaliation for requesting, or intending to request,
a monitoring device.'
31
V. CONCLUSION: USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR SURVEILLANCE
WITHOUT CONSENT
Tension between safety and privacy already exists in nursing
homes. Such tension involves circumstances where video surveil-
lance devices are installed without the knowledge of the nursing
home, without the consent of residents, and without notice to
employees. More legislation is needed to balance the need for
safety in nursing homes with the need to protect the privacy
rights of the parties involved. Of course, in the absence of legisla-
tion, citizens must rely on the court system to protect their privacy
rights. A recent Supreme Court case affirmed that privacy rights
within the home-especially in the wake of rapidly changing tech-
nology-continue to be highly valued. 32 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion mirrors this sentiment: "In the home . . .all details are
intimate details.' 33 This quote, and the holding of the case, sug-
gest that courts will continue to place limits on surveillance tech-
125 See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.845(a)-(c).
126 Id. § 242.846(b)(1) (stating that the resident, a resident's guardian or legal
representative must "release the institution from any civil liability for a violation
of the resident's privacy rights in connection with the use of the electronic
monitoring device").
127 See id. § 242.846(b)(2) (allowing for the obstruction of the camera while the
resident may be having private moments).
128 Id. § 242.846(b)(3).
129 Id. § 242.850.
13o Id. § 242.847(b).
131 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.851(a)(3).
132 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding the use of a thermal
imaging device that detects heat emitting from the home as a warrantless search
that violated the Fourth Amendment).
133 Id. at 37.
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nology used without consent in all dwellings that are considered
home, including nursing homes.
